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# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

(FOUO 11/80)



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'MILITARY STRATEGY': SOVIET MILITARY ENCYCLOPEDIA DEFINITION

Moscow SOVETSKAYA VOYENNAYA ENTSIKLOPEDIYA in Russian Vol 7, 1979 signed to press 7 Sep 79 pp 555-565

[Encyclopedia entry by N. V. Ogarkov: "Military Strategy"; names and transliterated terms between slantlines are italicized in source to identify them as entries in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia]

[Text] MILITARY STRATEGY [voyennaya strategiya] is a component part of the art of warfare /voyennoye iskusstvo/, its highest level, encompassing the theory and practice of preparing a country and the armed forces for war, of planning for and conducting war and strategic operations /strategicheskaya operatsiya/.

As a system of scientific knowledge, the theory of military strategy studies the laws and strategic nature of warfare and the methods used to conduct it, and works out the theoretical principles for planning, preparing for and conducting war and strategic operations. On the practical level, military strategy is concerned, under the specific conditions of a war, with the resolution of questions pertaining to the definition of the strategic tasks of the armed forces and to the personnel and equipment required to perform those tasks; with the elaboration and implementation of measures for preparing the armed forces, theaters of military operations /teatr voyennykh deystviy/, the economy and the population of the country for war, and for planning the war and strategic operations; with organization of the deployment of the armed forces and of their direction during the conduct of operations on a strategic scale, and also with the study of the capabilities of a probable enemy for conducting war and strategic operations.

Military strategy is closely interlinked with policy, emanating from it and serving it. "Strategy," said V. I. Lenin, "is subordinate to policy, and one is inseparably tied to the other" (Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, "Biografiya" [A Biography], 4th Edition, Moscow, 1970, p 505). This interdependence is produced by the nature of war as a continuation of the policy of classes and states by forceful means. The chief role of policy with respect to military strategy lies in the fact that policy elaborates the objectives of a war, defines the methods to be used to conduct it, assigns military strategy its tasks and creates the conditions required for their accomplishments, mobilizing the materials and human resources necessary to meet the needs of the war.

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Military strategy, in turn, affects policy. The theoretical conclusions reached by military strategy and the results of scientific studies in the area of military strategy are employed by the political leadership in defining the objectives of a war and the methods of achieving them, as well as in the practical accomplishment of tasks involved in military organizational development and in preparations for and the conduct of a war. Strategic operations constitute the basic means of achieving the political goals of a war. During a war the interrelationship between policy and military strategy is reflected, in particular, in the creation of single agencies of military and political leadership.

The subordination of military strategy to policy predetermines its class nature. A policy which reflects the interests of the progressive classes objectively generates an advanced military strategy. Conversely, a reactionary, aggressive military strategy conforms to a reactionary policy which reflects the interests of the exploitative class.

A state's economy and sociopolitical structure have a determining effect upon the nature and content of military strategy. History has shown that military strategy is directly dependent upon the level of development of the productive forces and the kind of production relations existing in a state (or a coalition of states). The development of production and the scientific and technological level reached determine the possibilities for the development and creation of appropriate means of warfare. This and the quantity and quality of the population have a direct effect upon the composition and organization of the armed forces and upon the means and methods of preparing for a war and conducting military operations on any, including the strategic, scale. F. Engels noted this feature when he wrote: "Nothing depends as much upon economic conditions as the army and navy. Their weaponry, composition, organization, tactics and strategy depend primarily upon the production level reached at the time and upon the means of communication" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], 2d Edition, Vol 20, p 171).

In peacetime the economy creates the required military equipment base for conducting a possible future war and determines the level of technical equipment of the armed forces, thereby affecting the state of their combat strength. The economy's capabilities in wartime predetermine the nature and the scale of the tasks which may be assigned to the armed forces and the possible scope and intensity of military operations. Military strategy which does not take into account the actual military and economic capabilities of the state (or coalition of states) is adventurist and, as a rule, meets with failure.

Military strategy, in turn, affects the economy, both in peacetime and in time of war. To one degree or another the development of the economy takes into account the requirements of military strategy, the needs of the armed forces and the requirements of the war in general for materiel and human resources. The conclusions drawn by military strategy are taken

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into account in planning a nation's economic development. Military strategy's influence upon the economy is manifested to the greatest degree in time of war.

Military strategy's dependence upon the state's social and political structure is manifested in the fact that a progressive structure makes it possible to realize the potentialities of military strategy to the greatest degree by strengthening the ideological, political and moral stability of the people and the army and by raising the political state and the morale of the troops to a high level. A reactionary structure limits the potentialities of military strategy, and a military strategy served by such a structure ordinarily suffers ultimate defeat in a war.

Military strategy is closely interlinked with a state's military doctrine (see Military Doctrine /Doktrina voyennaya/). Military strategy follows its principles in the performance of practical tasks. At the same time, the conclusions and recommendations arrived at by military strategy and military science /voyennaya nauka/ as a whole are used by the state's highest political and military leadership in the formation of its military doctrine. The theory of military strategy is based upon information provided by all the divisions of military science and upon conclusions and principles provided for military problems by the other social, natural and technical sciences. Military strategy dominates over the other components of the art of warfare--operational art /operativnoye iskusstvo/ and tactics /taktika/. It defines their tasks and the methods of operation of the troops (or naval forces) on the operational and tactical scales. The most important principles in the theory and practice of operational art and tactics are developed on the basis of military strategy requirements. At the same time, military strategy relies upon operational art and tactics, takes their capabilities into account and utilizes their achievements in the performance of strategic tasks.

The nature of the interrelationship between the components of the art of warfare changes as weapons are developed and the armed forces are equipped with them. In past wars strategic successes depended entirely upon tactical successes. With the development of operational art, which filled the gap between strategy and tactics, tactical successes began leading to operational successes, which, taken together, determined strategic success. With the development of nuclear missiles /raketno-yadernoy oruzhiye/ the connection between strategy, operational art and tactics was altered substantially. The strategic command obtained means of destroying the enemy, the employment of which permits it to resolve important strategic tasks. The operational and tactical commands, in turn, having at their disposal weapons with great range and power, became capable of performing tasks on a larger scale and of greater importance, exerting greater influence upon the achievement of strategic objectives.

At each stage of history various states (or coalition of states) have worked out a military strategy conforming to their policy, their economic capabilities and the peculiarities of their military-geographic situation.

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Soviet military strategy reflects the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government in the area of national defense, is based upon the tasks defined by the Constitution of the USSR for the armed defense of our socialist achievements and serves the most advanced social system. Its principles are developed on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory, and primarily on Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the army /marksistko-leninskoye ucheniye o voyne i armii/, in order to provide a reliable defense for the nation and other states of the socialist community under the specific conditions of the military and political situation. Bourgeois military strategy reflects the policy of the ruling imperialist groups and serves the class interests of the bourgeoisie and the reactionary goals of preparing for and conducting wars of aggression. It is reactionary in its political essence and in its ideological-theoretical and philosophical foundation. Soviet and bourgeois military strategy, therefore, differ fundamentally both in their political nature and in their methodological foundation. At the same time, they also possess a number of similar principles in the military-technical area, which reflect the laws of warfare.

## I

Military strategy came into being simultaneously with society's breakdown into classes and with the origination of armies and wars.

As an area of practical functioning of the highest military leadership, military strategy developed in antiquity--in the slave-holding states of the Far East, India and China, and also in Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome. As a theory, military strategy developed gradually, based on generalizing the experience of wars. In the first wars fought in the era of slavery strategy had the following main tasks: to prepare the army, to organize military campaigns and to define methods of conducting the individual engagements /srazheniye/ which determined the outcome of a war. As the slave-holding system of economic production developed, the state's capabilities grew and the size of the army increased, as did the scope of military operations and the duration of wars. Military strategy was faced with new tasks related to advanced planning and preparations for a war and determination of the most efficient sequence for the achievement of its military-political goals. New forms and methods of strategic operations came into being in the Greco-Persian Wars /greko-persidskikh voynakh/ of 500-449 B.C., the campaigns of Alexander the Great /Aleksandr Makedonskiy/ (334-323 B.C.), the Punic Wars /Punicheskiye voyny/ of the third-second centuries B.C., the Gallic Campaigns of Julius Caesar /Gall'skiye pokhody Yuliya Tsezarya/ and many other wars: the surprise invasion of an enemy's nation, the siege /osada/ and assault /shturm/ upon fortresses, the naval blockade /morskaya blokada/ and the counteroffensive /kontrnastupleniye/ (for example, the Scythians fighting the Persian army and the Parthians against the Romans). Simultaneous operations by armies and navies required coordination of their efforts. It became necessary to prepare the theaters of military operations in advance and to build powerful border fortifications to protect the state's borders (see The Great Wall of China /Velikaya kitayskaya stena/ and the Ramparts of Rome /Valy rimskiye/), which was of strategic importance.

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In Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome special state bodies (the national assembly in Sparta, the "Council of 500" in Athens, and others) and strategic agencies (the Council of Elders in Sparta, the committee of strategists in Athens, and others) were formed to deal with matters pertaining to preparations for and the conduct of war. Even then, there was a trend toward combining state and military leadership in time of war.

The first theoretical works to attempt to analyze questions of military strategy were printed in the ancient world. They include the "Treatise on Military Art" by the Chinese general and theoretician Sun Tzu /Sun'-tsy/ (6th-5th centuries B.C.), the works of Roman general Julius Caesar (first century B.C.), Roman historians Frontinus /Frontin/, Onosander (first century B.C.) and Vegetius /Vegetsiy/ (end of 4th-beginning of 5th century) and others.

The period during which feudal relations developed (5th-10th centuries) and the period of developed feudalism (11th-15th centuries) in Western Europe were characterized by the breakdown of states. The small feudal states engaged mainly in internecine wars among themselves, with limited political goals and on limited scales. Economic capabilities and sociopolitical conditions did not permit the creation of large armies. Large engagements were rarely conducted. As a result, military strategy experienced a certain stagnation in Western Europe until the 15th century.

In nations in which the formation of early-feudal states occurred without going through the slave-holding stage (the Arab Caliphate /Arabskiy khalifat/, for example), the development of military strategy was linked to extensive conquests or the repelling of expansionist campaigns by neighboring states. This dictated the creation of armed forces of considerable size and with a peculiar social composition and organization. Consequently, military strategy was characterized by the organization and conduct of large-scale military campaigns with tens of thousands of soldiers participating. The campaigns extended over hundreds and thousands of kilometers and lasted from several months up to 2 or 3 years. The combining of offensive and defensive operations in wars waged against several enemies was new in military strategy.

The military strategy of the Great Principality of Moscow in the 14th century was advanced for its time. It was determined by a policy aimed at uniting the Russian principalities and in the struggle against the Mongol-Tartars, and its strategic goals were achieved with a determined offensive and with the routing of the main enemy forces (see Battle of Kulikovo 1380 /Kulikovskaya bitva 1380/).

The period of feudalism's disintegration and the origin of bourgeois relationships began at the end of the 15th century. The formation of centralized states in the 16th-17th centuries produced far-reaching changes in the objectives and the content of military strategy. The

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development of firearms (14th century) and their introduction into the armed forces (15th-16th centuries) was of enormous importance. "The introduction of firearms," F. Engels stated, "revolutionized not only the very conduct of a war but also the political relations of domination and enslavement" (Ibid.). The military strategy of the centralized Russian state was based on its policy of consolidation and its struggle to liberate the Volga Basin and to reach the Baltic Sea. The development of military strategy was manifested in the skillful concentration of main efforts on the decisive axes, in the speed and boldness of the operations, in a determined struggle for the strategic initiative /strategicheskaya initsiativa/, and in the organization of long and difficult military campaigns (the campaigns against the Kazan Khanate in 1552 and the Astrakhan Khanate in 1556, for example).

Permanent mercenary armies /nayemnyye armii/ with centralized control and supply systems began to be created in Western Europe in the 17th century; the heavy cavalry of the knights was replaced by the infantry as the main combat arm; and a new combat arm, the artillery, was developed. The strategic leadership could not assign decisive missions to the mercenary armies. The goal and objective of strategic operations were therefore ordinarily not the enemy's army but his territory. The seizure of territory without decisive engagements and the ability to force the enemy's army to retreat /otstupleniye/ by approaching its lines of communication and threatening its supply base (magazines) was considered the greatest achievement of military strategy. Strong fortresses with powerful garrisons were built for counteracting maneuvers by enemy troops and for defending the territory. The troops were distributed evenly among the fortresses and strong points in an attempt to cover all directions. This military strategy became known as the cordon strategy /kordonnaya strategiya/, the ideologists behind which were H. Lloyd /Lloyd (Lloyd) Genri/ and H. Buzlow /Byulov/.

The 18th century was the most important period in the development of Russian military strategy. Its character was determined by an active foreign policy directed toward the all-round strengthening of the state. The reforms carried out by Peter I /Petr I/ and aimed at overcoming Russia's lag behind the advanced nations of Western Europe affected all aspects of state and public life, including the armed forces (see Military Reforms of Peter I /Voyennyye reformy Petra I/). These reforms were accelerated by the Northern War of 1700-1721 /Severnaya voyna 1700-21/. Russia's economic capabilities grew considerably in the first quarter of the 18th century (with the construction of industrial enterprises--metallurgical, metal-working, textile, leather goods and others which made it possible to increase the size and improve the equipment of the armed forces. A national army manned on the basis of compulsory military service was created for the first time in military history.

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The political goals and the nature of the wars which the Russian armies were forced to fight demanded a decisive, offensive military strategy. Peter I was against the cordon system of warfare. He considered the engagement and not fruitless maneuvering to the enemy's lines of communication, not a lengthy siege to starve the enemy out but a determined assault upon enemy fortresses to be the main and most effective means of achieving victory. Russian military strategy at that time was characterized by aggressiveness, the combining of offensive and defensive operations, and the striving to rout the main enemy forces. It involved interaction between land and naval forces. This kind of military strategy permitted Peter I to accomplish a number of strategic tasks successfully.

The development of military strategy at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries was related to the establishment of capitalistic relations and the creation of mass armies /massovaya armiya/ brought about by changes in society's social structure, the growth of production forces and the development of science and technology. The main tasks of Russian military strategy were considered to be those of achieving strategic goals with a determined offensive, gaining the initiative, concentrating forces on the decisive axis, bold maneuvering and skillful employment of the element of surprise. Russian military strategy was further developed in the concepts and the practical work of the outstanding Russian military leaders P. A. /Rumyantsev/ and A. V. /Suvorov/ and navy commander F. F. /Ushakov/.

The Great French Revolution /Velikaya frantsuzskaya revolyutsiya/ of 1789-1794 brought far-reaching changes in views on the nature of war and means of conducting it. V. I. Lenin pointed out that the French revolutionaries demonstrated enormous creativity, "restructuring the entire strategy system, breaking with all the old laws and customs of war and, in place of the old forces, creating a new, revolutionary and popular army and a new system of conducting war" ("Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], 5th Edition, Vol 32, p 80). Contrasted to the cordon military strategy practiced by states in the anti-French coalition was a military strategy based on concentrated, massive, swift and unexpected strikes and on daring strategic maneuvering. The military strategy practiced by the armies of revolutionary France was based on the concept of determining the outcome of a war in a single general engagement. Napoleon I /Napoleon I/ produced this strategic concept. The French army achieved great successes in wars waged against Austria, Prussia and other feudal states with mercenary armies. As early as the beginning of the 19th century, however, France's policy had changed into one of expansion with the objective of enslaving peoples. This policy determined the adventurist nature of France's military strategy.

The War of 1812 /Otechestvennaya voyna 1812/ exerted a great influence upon the development of Russian military strategy in the first part of the 19th century. The objectives of this war, which involved protecting the people's freedom and independence against foreign oppressors, conformed to the national interests of the Russian people, helped to build good

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morale among the troops and to carry out a determined and aggressive military strategy. The development of Russian military strategy during this period saw a departure from the concept of determining the outcome of a war in a single general engagement. It was characterized by the employment of various forms of strategic operations--harassment of the enemy during a retreat, a determined defense /oborona/ at advantageous positions, the counteroffensive, strategic pursuit /presledovaniye/ and others. The main objective of military operations was the decisive destruction of the enemy. Strategic operations were combined in a general plan based on the extensive maneuvering of several interacting armies. Operations by regular troops were skillfully combined with those of partisan forces. The theory and practical employment of strategic reserves /strategicheskkiye rezervy/ was raised to a new level. The main exponent of the principles underlying Russian military strategy, which were clearly manifested in the War of 1812, was the Russian military leader M. I. /Kutuzov/.

The military strategy practiced in wars waged at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries was generalized in the historical and theoretical works of K. Clausewitz /Klauzevits/, H. Jomini /Zhomini/ and a number of others. In his "Discourse on Great Military Operations..." and "Essays on the Art of Warfare," Jomini demonstrated the unsoundness of the cordon strategy and advanced the theory of so-called "strategic destruction" of the enemy with a determined offensive. He stereotyped the Napoleonic methods of conducting strategic operations, however, and failed to take into account the new conditions for conducting a war, which were already developing at that time. In his main work "Vom Kriege" [On War] (1832-34), Clausewitz formulated the principle linking war and policy. Not understanding the class nature of policy, however, he interpreted it from idealistic positions. Using the Hegelian dialectical method, he worked out the principles underlying the coordination of the defense and the offensive and formulated certain strategic principles for conducting a war. Basing his studies upon the experience of the Napoleonic wars, Clausewitz saw the tasks of military strategy as those of organizing a general engagement, recommending that all personnel and equipment be massed for this purpose.

Theoretical works on strategy were published in Russia during that same period. In his work "Obozreniye izvestneyshikh pravil i sistem strategii" [A Review of the Best Known Rules and Systems of Strategy] (1836), N. V. /Medem/ countered the views of Western European military theoreticians with thoughts to the effect that the principles of military strategy are not constant, that they change with time depending upon political and other conditions, upon the relationship between war and policy, between military strategy and tactics. In his work "Opyt teorii strategii" [Experience in the Theory of Strategy] (1842), based on a study of the War of 1812, Colonel P. A. Yazykov, professor at the Russian Military Academy, illustrated the increased influence exerted by popular masses upon the outcome of a war.

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Important sociopolitical and economic changes took place in the second half of the 19th century. They were related to the further development of capitalism. In the economic area, production was mechanized, production forces underwent further development and new branches of industry came into being. Military strategy was also developed on this new technological basis. Military strategy was especially influenced by the building of railroads, the invention of the telephone and telegraph, replacement of the sailing fleet with steamships and the introduction of rapid-firing rifled weapons. All this considerably accelerated the tempos for the concentration and movement of the mass armies, which had been created by that time in the main capitalist states, and led to an increase in the scope of strategic operations and to their conduct on several axes at once and on a broad front. It also increased the role of reserves and the importance of fortifications in the accomplishment of strategic tasks, (see Civil War of the USA 1861-65 /Grazhdanskaya voyna v SSHA 1861-65/, Austro-Prussian War of 1866 /Avstro-prusskaya voyna 1866/, the French-Prussian War of 1870-71 /Franko-prusskaya voyna 1870-71/, Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 /Russko-turetskaya voyna 1877-78/ and the Defense of Sevastopol 1854-55 /Sevastopol'skaya oborona 1854-55/).

In the second half of the 19th century the theory of military strategy was particularly developed in the works of a number of military theoreticians. Chief of the Prussian General Staff H. Moltke /Mol'tke/ (Sr), for example, attached prime importance to the conduct of surprise operations and to the extensive use of railroads for concentrating large masses of troops on the borders of an enemy state, and held to the concept of defeating the enemy in a general engagement. These strategic views reflected the aggressive policy of German capitalism.

In Russia the theory of military strategy was elaborated, at that time, in the works of G. A. /Leyer/, especially in "Opyt kritiko-istoricheskogo issledovaniya zakonov iskusstva vedeniya voyny (polozhitel'naya strategiya)" [Experience of Critical Historical Study of the Laws of the Art of Conducting War (A Positive Strategy)] (1869). He viewed war as a social phenomenon with inherent specific laws and stressed the close relationship between military strategy and policy, assigning the decisive role to the latter. Summarizing the experience of wars of the 19th century, he demonstrated how the conduct of war had been influenced by mass armies, rifled weapons, railroads, the telegraph, and so forth. He was the first to point out a qualitatively new development in the art of warfare of the 19th century, the strategic operation, regarding it as part of a campaign /kampaniya/ or of a war. Leyer, however, attached unqualified importance to the Napoleonic wars for the development of the art of warfare, identified the theory of military strategy with military science (regarding it as the philosophy of military affairs) and referred to the applied function of military strategy as the tactics of the theater of military operations.

A revolutionary leap forward was made in the scientific development of the theoretical principles of military affairs with the appearance of Marxism. K. Marx and F. Engels, analyzing the laws of social development, accomplished a real revolution in the understanding of such phenomena and

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subjects as war, the nature and purpose of the armed forces, and the patterns of development of the art of warfare, including military strategy. Various aspects of military strategy were elaborated in such works by F. Engels as his articles on the Crimean War, the national liberation wars in India and China, the Italian-French-Austrian War and the Civil War in the United States; in his "Zametki o voyne" [Comments on War], 1870-71, as well as in a number of articles and commentaries on military matters for the "New American Encyclopedia." The principles elaborated by K. Marx and F. Engels with respect to the economic and sociopolitical sources for the origin of wars, the material foundations for the development of military affairs and the laws involved, the interpretation of war as an extension of policy by the dominant classes, and their brilliant foresight in regard to the strategic nature of future wars were especially significant. These principles were subsequently fully taken into account and developed in Soviet military strategy.

Substantial changes occurred in the nature and methods of conducting a war when capitalism entered the stage of imperialism. The policy of the imperialist powers, which was designed to redvide an already divided world and to involve the broad popular masses in wars, had a decisive effect upon the development of military strategy. The creation of large factories and industrial complexes, new branches of industry (motor-building, automobile, chemical, and others), the increase in mechanized transport and mechanization of the basic production processes made it possible to equip the armed forces with large quantities of diverse military equipment and increased the economic factor in a war. All of this resulted in an increase in the scope and intensity of strategic operations and their further breakdown with respect to time and area; it also complicated troop control /upravleniye voyskami/ and support of their operations. The new characteristics of military strategy were manifested for the first time in wars fought in the era of imperialism in the Spanish-American War of 1898 /ispano-amerikanskaya voyna 1898/, the British-Boer War of 1899-1902 /anglo-burskaya voyna 1899-1902/ and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 /russko-yaponskaya voyna 1904-05/. In those wars originated the elements of army and, in the Russo-Japanese War, front operations.

Attempts to comprehend and generalize the new phenomena and developments in military affairs were reflected in a number of works by military theoreticians. In the works of A. Schlieffen /Shliffen/ of Germany, for example, there was substantiated a military strategy for conducting a war on two fronts, in the east and in the west. The enemy's decisive defeat was acknowledged as the main task of military strategy. Encirclement /okruzheniye/ was considered to be the most effective form of strategic operations. In his "Principles of Warfare" (1903) and "On the Conduct of War" (1904), F. Foch /Fosh/ of France regarded the offensive conducted along internal operational lines /operatsionnaya liniya/, in order to defeat the enemy piecemeal, to be the main form of strategic operations. Military strategy in Great Britain and the United States served the political goals of the ruling classes, which involved retaining and expanding colonial possessions, and the main stress was

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placed on achieving supremacy at sea /gospodstvo na more/. The British P. Colomb /Kolomb/ and the American A. Mahan /Mekhen/ were the theoreticians behind the so-called independent naval military strategy. The works of Russian military theoretician N. P. /Mikhnevich/, particularly his "Strategiya" [Strategy] (Books 1-2, 1899-1901), reflected the viewpoint that policy not only determines the objective of a war, but also has a decisive influence upon the selection of methods of conducting it. Mikhnevich also provided a basis for methods of conducting a strategic breakthrough and a strategic defense.

Operations were carried out on an enormous scale in World War I, 1914-1918 /pervaya mirovaya voyna 1914-18/. They involved multimillion-strong armies, armies with various equipment, including the recently developed tanks, aviation and chemical weapons. In connection with this the warring sides encountered a number of new factors. The increased scope and destructiveness of military operations made it necessary to reconsider former strategic views. The strategic concepts of most European nations, which were based on the eve of the war on the possibility of achieving victory in a short war of maneuver, proved to be unsound. In the working out of strategic plans it became necessary to give more thorough and complete consideration to a country's economic capabilities and availability of strategic reserves, and to organize strategic interaction between land and naval forces as well as strategic interaction with allies. In the first part of the war all the armies attempted to accomplish their tasks by employing only the strategic offensive with decisive objectives. However, already by the end of the first year of the war the coalitions on both sides were forced to switch to a strategic defense on continuous static fronts extending great distances. For a long time military strategy was characterized by a "positional impasse," the inability to resolve the problem of a strategic breakthrough of a static defense /pozitsionnaya oborona/. Russian military strategy found a partial solution to this problem in 1916 (see Southwest Front Offensive of 1916 /Yugo-Zapadnogo fronta nastupleniye 1916/). There were no solutions in the military strategies of France and Great Britain for executing a strategic breakthrough even up to the end of the war. This problem was resolved only on the tactical scale with the massed employment of artillery, tanks and aviation. Strategic objectives were achieved during the war by conducting successive operations and battles. Land forces had the decisive role in combat. Strategic operations at sea were limited basically to securing lines of communications and effecting a blockade of the enemy. Submarine operations had an important function. The problem of survivability of the armed forces and the replacement of massive losses was intensified. It began to be resolved by moving up strategic reserves and by intensifying the operation of the national economy.

During the war military strategy was gradually enriched by the experience in organizing strategic leadership. Front directorates [Frontovyye upravleniya] had been created in Russia even before the war began, and at the beginning of the war, along with the position of supreme commander,

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there was a Headquarters [Stavka]. In Germany strategic leadership was exercised through a supreme high command to army system (without the front echelon). France had directorates of field army groups. All of the states in the war combined military and political leadership and had higher political and strategic agencies for directing the war. Coalition strategy /koalitsionnaya strategiya/ problems--the development of single plans of action, the creation of an overall command, and the organization of strategic interaction--became very acute. These problems ordinarily presented great difficulties due to conflicts between the allies in a coalition. A supreme commander was not named for the armed forces of the Entente in Europe until 1918, for example.

## II

Soviet military strategy developed together with the birth of the Soviet state and its armed forces during the war against the forces of foreign interventionists and internal counterrevolution. It was based on the solid ideological and theoretical foundation of Marxism-Leninism. The basic principles of Soviet military strategy were worked out by V. I. /Lenin/, as applicable to the new historical conditions and as related to the specific tasks involved in the military defense of the world's first socialist state (See Defense of the Socialist Homeland /Zashchita sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva/). M. V. Frunze wrote the following about V. I. Lenin's outstanding role in the development of Soviet military strategy: "Comrade Lenin provides brilliant examples of strategic and tactical skill both for us and the future generation of revolutionaries" ("Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Moscow, 1977, p 254). The Communist Party's leadership in organizing the national defense, in military organizational development and in the training and strategic employment of the Soviet Armed Forces played the chief role in the development of the Soviet military strategy.

During the course of the Civil War and military intervention in Russia : 1918-1920 /Grazhdanskaya voyna i voyennaya interventsia v Rossii 1918-1920/, the decisive and uncompromising political goals of the belligerents determined the equally decisive strategic objectives and the active, offensive character of Soviet military strategy. In the struggle waged on several fronts one of the main tasks of Soviet military strategy was that of determining the decisive axes and concentrating on them the main efforts and the massing of personnel and equipment /massirovaniye sil i sredstv/. An important feature of Soviet military strategy was its flexibility and its ability to select types of strategic operations appropriate to the situation and to employ them in various combinations. "We should never in any way tie our hands in a single strategic maneuver," said V. I. Lenin ("Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], 5th Edition, Vol 36, p 37). The main type of strategic operation employed by the Soviet Army was the strategic offensive carried out by conducting successive offensive operations with the forces of one or two fronts. The main strikes /glavnyye udary/ in strategic offensive operations were carried out against enemy groupings whose defeat would decisively alter the military-political

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situation and would make it possible to liberate important political and economic regions. In many cases the strategic offensive was begun with a counteroffensive following a determined defense or the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Unlike the static operations conducted during World War I, military operations in the Civil War had a clearly expressed maneuvering character. The strategic defense was employed as a forced type of operation and, as a rule, was conducted by limited forces and characterized by powerful counterstrikes. The Civil War was distinguished by partisan movement conducted on a broad scale, which was coordinated with the operations of the regular troops and acquired strategic importance. Successfully carried out were tasks of strategic interaction including interaction between land forces and river and naval flotillas. Guided by the Leninist principle that "the winner in a war is that side which has the largest reserves, the greatest sources of strength and the greatest endurance among the popular masses" (Ibid., Vol 39, p 237), Soviet military strategy devoted constant attention to the creation and restoration of strategic reserves.

Following the Civil War, the development of military strategy was greatly influenced by the domestic and international situation of the USSR, the successful building of socialism and the stepped-up preparations of the imperialist powers for a war against the Soviet State.

The works of Soviet military leaders and military theoreticians were extremely important in the development of the theory of Soviet military strategy. M. V. Frunze's works "Yedinaya voyennaya doktrina i Krasnaya Armiya" [A Unified Military Doctrine and the Red Army] (1921), "Front i tyl v voyne budushchego" [The Front and Rear in a Future War] (1925), "Itogi i perspektivy voyennogo stroitel'stva..." [The Results of Military Organizational Development and Its Prospects...] (1925), and others, thoroughly described from Marxist-Leninist positions such things as the nature of a future war, preparation of the Soviet Armed Forces for such a war, the supplying of the army with military equipment, the role of the rear services, and others. In the works of M. N. /Tukhachevskiy/ "Strategiya natsional'naya i klassovaya" [National and Class Strategy] (1920), "Voprosy sovremennoy strategii" [Issues of Contemporary Strategy] (1926) and others, there were presented the basic principles of military strategy in a future war. In his book "Mozg armii" [The Brain of the Army] (Books 1-3, 1927-29), B. M. /Shaposhnikov/ analyzed many aspects of preparations for a war, the role of the General Staff, and the principles of coalition military strategy. In the book by V. K. /Triandafillov/ "Kharakter operatsiy sovremennykh armiy" [The Character of the Operations of Modern Armies] (1929), there were substantiated important strategic principles pertaining to the character of the preparations for and the conduct of a future war, and of the initial period in particular.

Prior to the beginning of World War II, Soviet military strategy validly presumed that the class nature of a war in defense of the socialist homeland would make the armed struggle uncompromising and determined, that

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the war might be prolonged and highly maneuverable, and would be conducted against a coalition of imperialist states. The strategic offensive in the form of successive front operations carried out with close interaction among all the services of the armed forces was recognized as the decisive type of strategic operations. And the decisive role was assigned to the ground forces, especially tank and mechanized combined units employed in close interaction with the air force. The theory of the operation in depth /glubokaya operatsiya/ developed in the 1930's was highly important to the development of military strategy. The main strategic tasks of the Navy were considered to be those of cooperating with the ground forces in operations conducted along the coastline and of conducting independent naval operations. Soviet military strategy considered the defense to be a valid form of military operations, but it did not devote adequate attention to the development of the theory of defensive operations on a strategic scale. It was also considered that a surprise attack by an aggressor was possible, but questions of repelling an unexpected attack by previously fully-mobilized enemy forces as well as the overall problem of the initial period of a war /nachal'nyy period voyny/ under changing conditions were not properly worked out. Not all of the correct theoretical principles worked out by Soviet military science with respect to military strategy were promptly taken into account in the practical work or included in regulations.

In the 1930's the development of bourgeois military strategy was considerably influenced by the aggravation of the overall crisis of capitalism and by the revolutionizing effect which the existence of the Soviet socialist state had upon the popular masses. The rapid development of weaponry (especially of bomber aviation, tanks, artillery and automatic weapons) made it necessary to reconsider many of the principles of bourgeois military strategy. The policy of the leading imperialist countries, which was directed against the world's first socialist state and toward the achievement of world domination, made it necessary to maintain multi-million-strong armies and use them in a war. The fear of broad popular participation in them, however, produced a number of new strategic concepts based on the idea of attaining victory with small armies (see "Small Armies" Theory /"Malykh armiy" teoriya/), supplied to the maximum degree with modern military equipment, or by a single means of warfare--by aviation (the theory of "air warfare" /vozdukhnaya voyna/, by tanks (the theory of "tank warfare" /tankovaya voyna/, and others. Fascist Germany's military theory was developed most intensively in the 1930's. Reflecting the policy of Germany imperialism's most reactionary circles, it called for a surprise attack without a declaration of war and for the mass employment of aircraft, tanks and airborne assaults for conducting a strategic offensive to a great depth. It was based on the theory of "blitzkrieg warfare" /molniyennaya voyna/. This military strategy was essentially adventuristic since it underestimated the economic, military and moral capabilities of probable enemies, primarily the USSR, and clearly overestimated its own capabilities.

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The military strategy of the United States and Great Britain assigned the decisive role in the achievement of war aims to military operations at sea and in the air, contemplating the employment of limited expeditionary forces outside their own territory. Accordingly, the main stress was on development of the Navy and the Air Force. A subordinate role was assigned to the ground forces, and practically no attention was given to questions pertaining to their strategic employment. The so-called strategy of "indirect actions" ["nepryamykh deystviy"] focused not upon participation of the armed forces in military operations in Europe but upon economic and political pressure (a blockade of the enemy).

Military strategy in France was based on a policy of reinforcing positions gained in World War I, strengthening its eastern borders and developing colonies. This contributed to the development of defensive trends in French military strategy. It underestimated the increased capabilities of modern weaponry. Primarily developed were methods of conducting a static war using the strong defensive installations of the "Maginot Line" /Mazhino liniya/ and the Belgian fortified areas. This trend in the military strategy of the Western countries was determined in great part by their policy of encouraging fascist aggression against the Soviet Union.

Japan's military strategy was based on a policy of establishing supremacy in Asia (the Soviet Far East, China and Southeast Asia) and weakening the positions of the United States and Great Britain in the Pacific Ocean. It developed methods of conducting strategic operations in a continental theater of operations and at sea, calculated to achieve surprise in its operations and to defeat the enemies in Southeast Asia and the Pacific theater of operations before they could deploy their main forces.

With such strategic views states entered World War II, 1939-45 /vtoraya mirovaya voyna 1939-1945/. During the course of that war these views were tested on a practical level and their validity was either confirmed or refuted.

Fascist Germany's military strategy produced considerable strategic successes during the first period of the war (before the USSR entered the war). The passive, wait-and-see military strategy of Great Britain and France not only contributed to the defeat of the militarily weak states of Poland, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Yugoslavia and Greece, but also resulted in the defeat of the Anglo-French forces and France's capitulation (the treasonous policy of the French ruling circles also contributed to the latter).

Fascist Germany's military strategy met with total failure in the war against the USSR. The Hitlerite command was forced to change not only the methods of strategic operations employed by its armed forces but also its plans for the war as a whole. While in the first stages of the war it attempted to perform strategic missions simultaneously on all axes, following its defeat near Moscow it began attempting to achieve the strategic goals of the war in stages by concentrating efforts on one strategic axis. After these attempts also met with defeat, fascist Germany switched to a

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strategic defense, setting itself the goal of depriving the Soviet Union of economic and human resources, depleting it and ending the war to its advantage by stubbornly holding important positions, destroying cities and villages and damaging industrial facilities.

During the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945 /Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna Sovetskogo Soyuz 1941-1945/, Soviet military strategy convincingly demonstrated its complete superiority over fascist Germany's military strategy and ultimately gained the upper hand. In the development of Soviet military strategy there was clearly demonstrated the dominant role of policy and the interrelationship of Soviet military strategy with the economy and the sociopolitical structure. The Soviet Supreme High Command based its definition of strategic objectives on the specific conditions of a situation and on the economic, moral-political and military capabilities of the homeland and those of the enemy. As with party policy and strategy, Soviet military strategy was also based "on the all-round consideration and application of the laws of war and on the objective and subjective factors determining the outcome of battles and engagements" (D. F. Ustinov, "Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1979, p 386). During the first period of the war, when the enemy held the strategic initiative, military strategy performed the tasks involved in setting up an active strategic defense, mainly employing the tactics of exhausting the enemy with determined resistance at already created and natural positions, frustrating the enemy's plans with determined counterstrikes and conducting individual offensive operations (army and front). In the process the strategic defense in 1941 was established, as a rule, as a forced measure, during the course of active enemy offensive operations; in 1942 it was prepared in advance, and in 1943 it was deliberately set up with the objective of exhausting the enemy and switching to a counteroffensive. Characteristic was an increase in the depth and the number of defensive zones /polosa oborony/. An important achievement of Soviet military strategy in the first and second periods of the war was the execution of a strategic counteroffensive near Moscow and its development into a general offensive by Soviet troops in the winter of 1941-1942, and also in 1942-1943 at Stalingrad. During the second period of the war the Soviet Army seized the strategic initiative and secured it once and for all. All subsequent development of Soviet military strategy was related to the main type of strategic operations--the strategic offensive. In the third period of the war, under conditions of increasing combat strength of the armed forces and the build-up of large strategic reserves, the development of Soviet military strategy was manifested in the successive and continuous conduct of strategic offensive operations over the entire Soviet-German front. Fundamentally new forms of strategic operations by the armed forces were discovered and successfully employed. These were front group operations /operatsiya gruppi frontov/ involving from 100 to 200 divisions, 20,000-40,000 guns and mortars, between 3,000 to 6,000 tanks and self-propelled artillery units and from 2,000 to 7,500 aircraft. Such operations were carried out on the most important strategic axes and were characterized by the decisiveness of the objectives, great

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spatial scope, the dynamic nature of the combat operations, and the achievement of important military-political and strategic results. Some of them were carried out on a front of 800-1,000 kilometers and extended to a depth of up to 500-600 kilometers. From 50 to 100 enemy divisions were destroyed in the process.

One of the most characteristic features of the strategic operations carried out was the encirclement and destruction of large groupings of enemy troops. Military strategy underwent considerable development with respect to the organization and conduct of large joint operations involving long-range aviation and naval forces.

In general, during the Great Patriotic War the Soviet military and political leadership acquired a great deal of practical experience in mobilizing all the nation's forces and resources and its armed forces for the achievement of victory, making strategic use of all services of the armed forces, organizing strategic interaction among fronts, groups of fronts and services of the armed forces, and directing the armed struggle. The creation, build-up and employment of strategic reserves was one of the important trends of development of Soviet military strategy.

During the war Soviet military strategy was enriched with experience in the strategic leadership of massive armed forces in military operations conducted on fronts of enormous length. The Communist Party concentrated its attention primarily upon directing the army and navy and upon building them up in every way possible and providing them with everything necessary to defeat the enemy. During the war years the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Central Committee was "that headquarters from which the highest political and strategic direction of military operations was exercised" (Tridtsatiletiye Pobedy sovetskogo naroda v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne. Dokumenty i materialy" [The 30th Anniversary of the Soviet People's Victory in the Great Patriotic War: Documents and Materials], Moscow, 1975, p 20). Strategic direction of the armed forces was exercised through the Headquarters, Supreme High Command /Stavka Verkhovnoy Glavnokomandovaniya/ (SVCK) and the General Staff /General'nyy shtab/ subordinated to it. The State Defense Committee (GKO) and Headquarters, Supreme High Command included party and state leaders and prominent military leaders. I. V. Stalin was chairman of the State Defense Committee and the Supreme Commander. All of this insured total unity of the party, state and military leadership and made it possible to work out the most expedient decisions and to implement them promptly and efficiently. Centralization of strategic leadership was combined with the enlistment by Headquarters, Supreme High Command of the commanders of operational-strategic and operational field forces to work out the plans for strategic operations.

Victory over the fascist bloc in World War II was achieved through the joint efforts of the peoples and the armed forces of countries of the anti-Hitlerite coalition, with the decisive role performed by the Soviet Union and its armed forces. The Leninist position [polozheniye] that cooperation among states with different social systems is possible was

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actually confirmed during the war years. Efforts in the area of military strategy were also coordinated to a certain degree in this coalition war. The inconsistency demonstrated by the political leadership of the United States and Great Britain at that time, however, prevented the complete coordination of strategic action to defeat the common enemy. Prior to 1944 the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain carried out offensive operations in secondary theaters of military operations-- in North Africa, Northern Italy and the basin of the Pacific Ocean. In 1944 when fascist Germany's defeat by the armed forces of the USSR had become a real possibility, the allies undertook large-scale offensive operations in Western Europe. The allies executed the strategic offensive by conducting a number of successive operations with overwhelming superiority over the enemy in personnel and equipment. It was during this period that the military strategy of the United States and Great Britain underwent its greatest development in the area of naval landing operations and the employment of airborne landing forces, although the strategic leadership, which was of a coalition character, experienced internal friction resulting from conflicts between the ruling circles of the United States and Great Britain.

## III

After World War II ended the development of military strategy in all states took into account the experience of the war and the new distribution of military-political forces in the world. Having converted to peaceful, creative labor, the CPSU and the Soviet Government were forced to reckon with the fact that the governments of the former allies in the anti-Hitlerite coalition (primarily the United States and England) had departed from the principles agreed upon for the postwar organization of the world. International imperialism set out on a path of open preparations for a new war and the conduct of policy "from a position of strength" with respect to the USSR and the other socialist countries. The rapid progress being made in the field of military technology had great significance for the development of military strategy. The advent of nuclear weapons and missiles, the improvement of other types of weapons and equipment and their introduction into the armed forces resulted in fundamental changes in views on the nature of war and the methods of conducting military operations and made it necessary to review many theoretical propositions of military strategy and the art of warfare as a whole in all countries.

The leadership of the United States, for example, having proclaimed a policy of operating "from a position of strength" and proceeding under the assumption that it had superiority over the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons and means of their delivery, adopted the so-called "massive retaliation" strategy /"massirovannogo vozmezdiya" strategiya/ in 1953, which envisaged preparations for and the conduct of a general nuclear war against the USSR. In 1961, as a result of the increased nuclear capability of the USSR and the established approximate parity in the correlation forces, the leadership of the United States was forced to switch to a "flexible response" strategy /"gibkogo reagirovaniya" strategiya/, and subsequently imposed it on the

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NATO bloc. This strategy acknowledged the possibility of conducting not only a general nuclear war but limited wars as well, with or without the use of nuclear weapons. In 1971 the United States proclaimed the "realistic deterrent" strategy /"realisticheskogo sderzhiraniya" strategiya/ ("realistic scare"), which retained as its basis the fundamental propositions of the former strategy but gave it greater aggressiveness, activeness and flexibility in the build-up and employment of the military strength of the United States and its allies and in the methods of conducting various types of wars against the Soviet Union and other nations of the Warsaw Pact /Varshavskiy Dogovor/.

The contemporary military strategy of the United States and other NATO nations is based mainly on the concept of waging a general nuclear war, in which nuclear weapons, primarily strategic, will have the decisive role. At the same time, it acknowledges the possibility of conducting lengthy military operations with the employment of only conventional weapons, and operations in individual theaters of military operations with the limited use of nuclear weapons. Great importance is attached to the uniting of military efforts through the creation of various military-political blocs.

The United States and other NATO nations have launched an unprecedented arms race /gonka vooruzheniy/ and are increasing their military expenditures in order to implement their strategic concepts. Large-scale plans for modernizing the armed forces, which go far beyond those needed for defense, are being implemented at an accelerated rate, and new types of weapons are being created. These include combat weapons incorporating new physical principles. China, which has become a serious source of military danger in the world, has actively entered into this arms race. The military strategy of those states is becoming more and more aggressive.

Under these conditions the Soviet Union, while conducting an active peace-loving foreign policy, has been forced to concern itself with the strengthening of its own defense capability and the combat strength of its armed forces, and with the development of Soviet military science and the art of warfare, including military strategy.

The development of Soviet military strategy since World War II can be divided into two periods. The first covers the years 1945 to 1953, during which time Soviet military strategy was developed on the basis of the very rich experience acquired in the Great Patriotic War, while at the same time taking into account the availability of atomic weapons in the United States. The armed forces of the USSR were supplied with more modern military equipment. Methods of conducting strategic operations were developed which took into account the increased striking and fire power as well as the mobility and maneuverability of the troops. The second period of development for Soviet military strategy (after 1954) has involved the introduction of nuclear weapons and missiles into the armed forces and the development of new services and branches of the armed forces. It is characterized by important changes in both the theory and practice

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of military affairs. Soviet military strategy has been faced with a number of fundamentally new tasks. The most important of these involved researching the features of a nuclear war and methods of conducting it, the organizational development of the armed forces with a view to ensuring the capability of repelling a massive nuclear attack by aggressors, maintaining the armed forces at a constantly high level of combat readiness, insuring their organized entry into a war, regardless of the conditions under which it begins, and others. Creation of the Warsaw Pact Organization in 1955 created a new task for military strategy, that of working out common principles of military strategy for nations in the socialist community which organically combine the international and national interests of nations in the alliance.

Soviet military strategy is determined by the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state, which combines the struggle for peace with preparedness for decisively repelling aggression and reliably protecting the independence and socialist achievements of the Soviet people and the peoples of other friendly socialist nations. Soviet military strategy, just as Soviet military doctrine as a whole, has a particularly defensive focus and does not provide for any sort of preemptive strikes or premeditated attack.\* Its main task is that of developing methods of repelling an attack by an aggressor and of defeating the aggressor by conducting decisive operations. Unlike the military strategy of the imperialist states, which openly espouses the arms race and the establishment of military-technical superiority, Soviet military strategy is based on the need to provide the Soviet Armed Forces with everything necessary to defend the country and defeat an aggressor and to maintain the armed forces at a level insuring the homeland's security. Soviet military strategy takes into account the capability of the USSR and the other socialist countries to prevent a probable enemy from achieving military-technical superiority. At the same time, it does not pursue the goal of achieving military-technical superiority over other countries. "...While building up our armed forces, we in no way go beyond what is actually necessary for our security and the security of our socialist friends. We threaten no one and impose our will upon no one" (L. I. Brezhnev, "Aktaul'nyye voprosy ideologicheskoy raboty KPSS" [Current Issues in the Ideological Work of the CPSU], 2d Edition, Vol 2, Moscow, 1979, p 532).

Strategic arms limitation agreements between the USSR and the United States concluded on the principled basis of full equality and mutual [odinakovoy] security, represent a fair balancing of the interests of the USSR and the United States. The Soviet Union has consistently fulfilled its commitments and proposed specific measures for further restraining and halting the arms race. Soviet military strategy is based on the possibility of preventing war in the modern era, while at the same time taking into account the military preparations of the imperialist states and the danger of the outbreak of war resulting from their aggressive policy.

\*[... imeyet sugubo oboronitel'nuyu napravlennost', ne predusmatrivayet kakikh-libo uprezhdayushchikh udarov ili prednamerennogo upadeniya.]

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simultaneous and successive strategic operations, including operations conducted in a continental theater of military operations. The overall objective of each such operation comprises one of the specific military-political goals of the war, involved with ensuring the protection and retention of important areas of friendly territory and, when necessary, also with the defeat of a specific strategic grouping of the enemy. Each operation will have its own characteristic scope determined by the capabilities of the sides, their access to means of destruction and their ability to provide logistical support to the troops (or forces), as well as by the specific conditions of the theater of military operations.

The following may be conducted within the framework of a strategic operation in a continental theater of military operations: initial and subsequent operations by fronts, and on coastal axes, initial and subsequent operations by fleets as well; air defense, airborne landing, naval landing, combined landing and other operations, as well as nuclear missile and air strikes. Other types of strategic operations may also be conducted. Modern operations will be characterized by larger scale and will involve a fierce struggle to seize and retain the strategic initiative, by highly mobile operations of groupings of armed forces on independent axes under conditions of the absence of continuous fronts, by deep reciprocal penetrations by the warring sides, and by rapid and abrupt changes in the operational-strategic situation. The objectives of all these operations, like victory in the war as a whole, can only be achieved by the combined efforts of all services and branches of the armed forces. In view of this, organizing and maintaining close and continuous coordination in a war and in strategic operations is regarded as one of the most important principles of Soviet military strategy.

Soviet military strategy considers that multimillion-strong mass armies are necessary to conduct a modern war. Since it is practically impossible to maintain such armies in peacetime and since they are not required to meet the nation's defense needs, there are provisions for the adequate mobilizational deployment of the armed forces. In connection with the possibility of surprise attack by an aggressor, Soviet military strategy assigns special importance to ensuring that the armed forces are in a state of combat readiness, which is considered in a broad sense: "...in the combat readiness of the troops, just as at a focal point, are concentrated the tremendous efforts and material outlays of the people to equip the armed forces; the awareness, combat training and discipline of all servicemen; the skill of commanders in directing the troops, and many other factors. In the final analysis, this is the crown of combat skill worn by the troops in peacetime and the key to victory in a war" (L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom" [On a Leninist Course], Vol 2, Moscow, 1970, p 49).

While regarding the offensive as the main type of strategic operation, Soviet military strategy at the same time acknowledges the important role of defense in a war and the necessity and possibility of organizing and conducting a defense on a strategic scale for the purpose of disrupting

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or repelling an enemy attack, holding (or defending) specific territory, gaining time to concentrate the necessary forces or to conserve forces on certain axes and to create superiority over the enemy on other axes. Furthermore, it is taken into account that a defense on any scale should be active and should create the conditions for switching to an offensive (or counteroffensive) for the purpose of totally routing the enemy.

Soviet military strategy considers all-round support of the operations of the armed forces and firm centralized control of those forces to be an essential condition for the achievement of victory in a war and for success in strategic operations. Soviet military strategy has accumulated a large amount of experience in strategic leadership. Taking the new requirements into account, this experience is used for accomplishing the tasks facing it. Soviet military strategy is unified for all services of the armed forces and its principles are the same both for conducting a war as a whole and for conducting strategic operations, taking into account specific conditions in the various theaters of military operations.

On the one hand, control of troops (or forces) under contemporary conditions is becoming more and more complicated and the volume of work performed by strategic control agencies is continuously increasing. On the other hand, the amount of time available to perform the work is being reduced. As a result, increased demands are being made with respect to stability, flexibility, efficiency and secrecy of control under conditions of active radioelectronic counteraction by the enemy.

Soviet military strategy serves the cause of peace and security of nations and the interests of defending the achievements of socialism against encroachments by any aggressor. It is developed and perfected in accordance with the changes occurring in the world military-political situation and with the constantly growing economic and moral-political capabilities of the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community.

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Soviet military strategy sees a future war, should the imperialists manage to unleash one, as a decisive clash between two opposed world socioeconomic systems--socialism and capitalism. It is assumed that the majority of the world's states may be drawn into such a war simultaneously or successively. It will be a global struggle of unprecedented scope and fierceness involving multimillion-strong coalitions of armed forces; it will be conducted without compromise and will pursue the most decisive political and strategic goals. All of the military, economic and spiritual strength of the warring states, coalitions and social systems will be fully utilized in the war.

Soviet military strategy assumes that a world war may be started and conducted for a certain period of time [opredelennoye vremya] with conventional weapons alone. The expansion of military operations, however, can result in its escalation into a general nuclear war, with nuclear weapons, primarily strategic, as the main means of conducting it. Soviet military strategy is based on the position that the Soviet Union, proceeding on the basis of the principles of its policy, will not be the first to employ such weapons. It is in principle against the use of weapons of mass destruction /*oruzhiye massovogo porazheniya*/. Any possible aggressor should clearly understand, however, that it will be the target of an annihilating answering strike in the event of a nuclear-missile attack against the Soviet Union or the other countries in the socialist community.

It is believed that with the modern means of destruction a world nuclear war will be relatively short. Considering the enormous potential military and economic capabilities of coalitions of warring states, however, the possibility is not ruled out that such a war could also be a lengthy one. Soviet military strategy is based on the understanding that should a nuclear war be initiated against the Soviet Union, the Soviet people and their armed forces must be prepared for the most severe and prolonged trials. In such a case, the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist states will have definite [opredelennyye] advantages over the imperialist states, advantages stemming from the just objectives of the war and the advanced nature of their social and state systems. This will provide them with objective possibilities for achieving victory. However, timely and comprehensive preparation of the country and its armed forces are essential in order to realize these possibilities.

Soviet military strategy also takes into consideration the possibility of the outbreak of local wars /*lokal'naya voyna*/, the political nature of which is determined by class positions and the Leninist position with respect to just and unjust wars. While supporting wars of national liberation, the Soviet Union decisively opposes the local wars unleashed by the imperialists, considering not only their reactionary essence, but also the great danger posed by the possibility of their escalating into a world war.

Evaluating the strategic content of a war, Soviet military strategy considers that a war comprises a complex system of interrelated, large-scale

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